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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.*
I. hIRODUCTION
As so often happens in American jurisprudence, two worthy and weighty
considerations are being balanced to shape the law in courts across the
states. More often than not, differing views on such considerations create
splits in the circuits based on the same issue. The two considerations at work
in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. are the purpose and function of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) versus the strong emphasis
federal courts place on arbitration as a means to resolve disputes through the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In the context of private arbitration
agreements, the two require a balancing to be done by a court to satisfy both
considerations.
In one of the most recent splits among the federal circuit courts of
appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit allied
itself with the Second Circuit by refusing to allow the EEOC to sue in
federal court for "make whole" relief on behalf of an employee that has
signed a mandatory arbitration agreement. On the other side, the Sixth
Circuit agreed that the EEOC has broad powers to sue outside of a private
arbitration agreement, to the maximum extent of its powers. The effect was
to allow the EEOC to sue not only for injunctive relief but also for "make
whole" relief for an employee otherwise barred from doing so by his private
arbitration agreement.
RI. THE TENSIONS LEADING TO WAFFLE HOUSE
There are two main tensions that have led to this split in the circuits. The
first is the federal emphasis on the FAA upholding arbitration agreements as
a means to resolve employment disputes. The second is the broad power
granted to the EEOC to sue on behalf of an employee for both class-wide
relief and "make whole" relief. Both have been given substantial emphasis
by the circuits, but to varying degrees.
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
The Federal Arbitration Act1 provides that written, valid arbitration
clauses in contracts involving interstate commerce are enforceable in the
* 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999).
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United States. In the last several years it has been given broad acceptance
and interest, especially by the Supreme Court.2 Due to heavy docket loads
and other reasons, the Supreme Court continuously has emphasized the need
to interpret the FAA liberally, upholding arbitration agreements and
allowing them in many situations.3 The Court even has stated that "questions
of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy
favoring arbitration." 4
Under such acceptance, it should be no surprise that employers
increasingly are requiring potential employees to sign an arbitration
agreement as a condition of employment. 5 Such agreements are seen by
employers as a means to reduce the costs of potential claims as well as to
speed their resolution. 6 Despite the acceptance of the FAA in the
employment context, especially under collective bargaining agreements, only
recently has it been accepted that the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and Title VII claims can be adjudicated under a predispute
arbitration agreement. 7
First, courts collectively interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.8 to mean that Title VII claims were not
arbitrable.9 The prevailing attitude toward arbitration was of distrust, but
19 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1994).
2 See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995)
(stating that where issues are potentially susceptible to an arbitration agreement, all
doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration).
3 See Kenneth R. Davis, A Proposed Framework for Reviewing Punitive Damages
Awards of CommercialArbitrators, 58 ALB. L. REV. 55, 66 (1994).
4 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
5 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the (Alternative)
Forum: Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake of Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. REV. 591, 591-92.
6 See Jean R. Sternlight, Compelling Arbitration of Claims Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1866: What Congress Could Not Have Intended, 47 KAN. U. L. REV. 273, 326
(1999).
7 See id. In spite of general acceptance of arbitration agreements, such acceptance of
arbitration agreements in the context of statutory claims has been only very recent. Such
agreements have been under attack in many courts, and they continue so to be. See
generally Michael Delikat & Rene Kathawala, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Claims Under Pre-Dispute Agreements: Will Gilmer Survive?, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 83
(1998).
8 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974) (holding that an arbitration agreement from a collective
bargaining agreement could not keep a Title VII claim from federal court because
Congress intended federal courts to have final enforcement over Title VII claims).
9 See, e.g., Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir.
1998).
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that attitude softened in a series of cases during the 1980s. Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,10 for example, stated that if a
party made an arbitration agreement, it "should be held to it unless Congress
itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for
the statutory rights at issue."11
A similar attitude toward the FAA was evidenced in Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon,12 a case in which the plaintiff was alleging
statutory claims arising from a dispute in stock transactions. The McMahon
Court stated that "we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the
desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals should
inhibit enforcement of the [FAA]. ' ' 13 The last case, Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.,14 wherein claimants asserted that an
arbitration clause was not enforceable in a claim of fraud, also came out in
favor of arbitration. 15 The Court reasoned that "a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution
in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."16 The Court's reiteration of
Mitsubishi in the subsequent cases reinforced the federal push toward
upholding arbitration agreements.
The controversial Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.17 furthered
the Court's insistence on upholding arbitration agreements. Gilmer, an
employee of Interstate, was terminated when he was sixty-two years old. He
filed suit in federal court alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act 18 and sought to get out of his arbitration agreement with
his employer. The Supreme Court once again upheld the validity of the
arbitration agreement.19 The Court held that unless Congress clearly
provided that courts could preclude arbitration agreements based on
statutory rights, it hesitantly would set aside the FAA.20
10 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985) (holding that claims under the Sherman Act are
arbitrable).
I1 Id. at 628-29.
12 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (holding that claims under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 are arbitrable).
13 Id. at 226 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27).
14 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
15 See id. at 483, 486.
16 Id. at 481 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
17 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (holding that an ADEA claim could be subjected to
compulsory arbitration under the arbitration agreement in an employment application).
18 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
19 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
20 See id. at 26.
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Since Gilmer, lower courts have expanded the circumstances in which an
arbitration agreement is upheld when an employee's claims are based on
statutory rights.21 This, as well as other decisions, show that the Supreme
Court has pushed strongly the acceptance of arbitration agreements in
employment disputes, even if it is of complex Title VII or other statutory
claims. 22
B. The Powers of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
The powers of the EEOC are more than substantial. The purpose of the
1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to give the EEOC
teeth in enforcing the inadequate voluntary approach of bringing suit by the
employee. 23 The EEOC was given primary jurisdiction over employee
complaints under Title Vll. 2 4 For example, if an employee believes that the
employer is breaking the law in its employment practices, the employee must
first go to the EEOC before taking other action. The EEOC then provides a
180 day waiting period to decide if there was "reasonable cause" that the
employer used unlawful employment practices.25 The EEOC, if it finds that
there is "reasonable cause," can sue either on its own behalf, or it can allow
the employee to sue.26 Either way, the EEOC makes the call as to whether it
will sue or allow the employee to do so.27
The EEOC can sue for several forms of relief. It can seek injunctive
relief, reinstatement or hiring of employees, back pay, and compensatory and
punitive damages. 28 Precisely because Congress felt that the laws were not
being enforced by employees, it gave the EEOC broad and sweeping powers
to enforce compliance with employment practices. 29
21 See, e.g., Miller v. Public Storage Management, Inc., 121 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir.
1997) (holding that the plaintiff did not show that Congress did not intend to permit
courts to uphold arbitration agreements under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885-86 (4th Cir.
1996) (concluding that a union must arbitrate an ADA claim under an arbitration clause
in its collective bargaining agreement).
22 See Delikat & Kathawala, supra note 7, at 88.
23 See EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 455 (6th Cir. 1999).
24 See General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333-34 (1980).
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994).
26 Id. § 2000e-5(f).
27 See id.
28 See id. § 2000e-5(g)(1).
29 See EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 457 (6th Cir. 1999).
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IT. WAFFLE HOUSE: FACTS AND HISTORY
On June 23, 1994, Eric Baker sought employment with Waffle House,
Inc. ("Waffle House") in Columbia, South Carolina. He filled out an
employment application that contained a clause that would submit to binding
arbitration "any dispute or claim concerning Applicant's employment with
Waffle House, Inc., or any subsidiary or Franchisee of Waffle House, Inc., or
the terms, conditions or benefits of such employment. '30 Baker did not
accept employment at that particular Waffle House location, but he did
accept it at another across town.31
He began work on August 10, 1994, and two weeks later he suffered a
seizure while on the job. The seizure was apparently a result of a change in
his medication that controlled a seizure disorder that he developed from a car
accident years earlier. Baker was discharged from his employment with
Waffle House on September 5, 1994. Only days later, he filed a complaint
with the EEOC, which in turn filed an enforcement action against Waffle
House claiming a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.32
The complaint by the EEOC sought to correct unlawful employment
practices by Waffle House and to seek appropriate relief for Baker.33 It
sought a permanent injunction barring Waffle House from discriminatory
practices on the basis of disability and an order requiring that Waffle House
change its policies and carry out programs to create opportunities to halt the
effects of disability discrimination.34 On behalf of Baker, the EEOC sought
back pay, compensation for pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses suffered by
Baker, punitive damages, and reinstatement.35
Waffle House sought to compel arbitration of Baker's claim and to stay
the litigation, as well as to dismiss the action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). 36 The magistrate who was assigned the motion
30 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 807 (4th Cir. 1999).
31 See id. This became a point for reversal by the Fourth Circuit. The district court
held that the application was inapplicable and thus that the arbitration clause likewise
was inapplicable because the application was filled out at a different Waffle House
location than the one at which he worked. See id. at 808. The Fourth Circuit overturned
this decision, stating that "[tihe employment application Baker completed was the
standard form application for employment with the corporation Waffle House, Inc., and
not with an individual Waffle House facility." Id. (emphasis omitted).
32 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. 1 1997).
33 See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 807.
34 See id.
35 See id. at 807-08.
36 See id. at 808; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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recommended to the court that the arbitration agreement be held valid and
that the EEOC be required to arbitrate the agreement. 37 The district court
declined to accept the magistrate's recommendation and denied Waffle
House's motions, concluding that the arbitration agreement was inapplicable
because Baker had signed the agreement at a different Waffle House.38
Waffle House filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's
denial of a stay of the proceedings and its refusal to compel arbitration. 39
IV. THE FOURTH CiRcurr's HOLDING
After finding that there was an enforceable arbitration agreement and
thus reversing the district court, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered the significance that the arbitration agreement
would have on the parties.40 The EEOC argued that it never agreed to
arbitrate its statutory claim and that under its statutory mandate, it has the
power to bring an action in federal district court where venue is proper.41
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the EEOC.42
The court discussed the power of the EEOC, emphasizing its statutory
mandate and the purposes of enforcement of the antidiscriminatory
employment laws. It also found that the "statutory structure of Title VIl's
enforcement remedies (and therefore those of the ADA) reflects the notion
that the scope of the public interest exceeds that of the individual's
interest. '43 Moreover, the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court
implicitly recognized that under Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,44
the EEOC is not bound by private arbitration agreements when acting in its
public role.45 The Fourth Circuit emphasized that Gilmer stated that "it
should be remembered that arbitration agreements will not preclude the
EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief. 46
In spite of finding such a broad mandate on behalf of the EEOC, the
court nonetheless recognized that the EEOC's "role in vindicating in federal
37 See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 808.
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id. at 809.
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 id. at 810.
44 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
45 Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 811.
46 Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32).
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court the individual interests of the charging party implicates the competing
federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements." 47 After
discussing the history and bias in the federal court system favoring
arbitration agreements, the court decided that the balance struck by the
Second Circuit, allowing the EEOC to pursue a person's claim in federal
court only for large-scale injunctive relief, was the proper balance.48
V. ANALYSIS
Though the Fourth Circuit recognized such a strong emphasis on the
power of the EEOC, it nevertheless struck the balance closer to the FAA
than did the Sixth Circuit. Both courts recognized the importance of the
powers of the EEOC, but the Fourth Circuit felt that the federal emphasis on
upholding arbitration agreements would be served better by allowing the
EEOC to sue only for large-scale injunctive relief rather than allowing them
to sue not only for injunctive relief but also for "make whole" relief.49
The Waffle House court stated that "[tlo permit the EEOC to prosecute
in court Baker's individual claim-the resolution of which he had earlier
committed by contract to the arbitral forum-would significantly trample
this strong policy favoring arbitration." 50 Herein lies the difference between
the Fourth and Second Circuits' and the Sixth Circuit's view. It is the degree
to which the emphasis on upholding arbitration agreements is viewed. In
EEOC v. Frank's Nursery and Crafts, Inc.,51 though recognizing that the
interests of the FAA and the EEOC overlapped,52 the Sixth Circuit
emphasized the authority of the EEOC at the expense of the FAA. It stated,
"[s]ignificantly, an individual may not, in an effort to effectuate her own
interests, take away the enforcement authority of the EEOC even if she
wishes to withdraw her charge of discrimination. '53 The "enforcement
authority," as recognized by the Sixth Circuit, was the entire enforcement
authority, and nothing short. Because the "EEOC [has] the right to represent
an interest broader than that of a particular individual when it exercises its
authority to sue," upholding arbitration "would grant that individual the
47 Id. at 812.
4 8 See id.
49 See id.
50 Id.
51 177 F.3d 448, 455 (6th Cir. 1999).
52 See id. at 461.
531d. at 456.
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ability to govern whether and when the EEOC may protect the public interest
and further our national initiative against employment discrimination." 54
Alternatively, the Fourth Circuit, though recognizing the EEOC powers
as strong, did not feel that taking "make whole" relief from the EEOC would
hamper considerably its power. The court stated that although the EEOC
mandate is strong, it "cannot outweigh the policy favoring arbitration when
the EEOC seeks relief specific to the charging party who assented to
arbitrate his claims."'55 The view of the Fourth Circuit is that the EEOC
retained sufficient power to fulfill its mandate through the class-wide
injunction.56
Opposing this view, the Sixth Circuit found that as a matter of contract
law, a party had no power to take the mandate of the EEOC. The court stated
that "one individual cannot contractually waive the statutory rights of one
who is not a party to the contract, and one individual cannot.., waive the
statutory right of a federal sovereign to vindicate the public interest unless
the government agrees to such waiver." 57 The court concluded that if the
plaintiff in Frank's Nursery completely contracted away the EEOC's right to
sue, it "would completely undo Congress' effort."58
VI. CONCLUSION
As more employees sign arbitration agreements as part of their
employment contracts, it appears likely that more courts will encounter the
need to strike a balance between the considerations behind the EEOC and
the FAA. Those decisions will come down to the same balancing between
the competing emphasis of the FAA and the mandate of the EEOC. The
balance will be struck depending, as it did in the Fourth, Second, and Sixth
Circuits, upon whether the EEOC's full power is viewed as eclipsing the
federal emphasis on the FAA. For now, employees in the Fourth and Second
Circuits will have to arbitrate their statutory claims under their arbitration
agreements, but employees in the Sixth Circuit, if the EEOC finds
"reasonable cause" and chooses to sue, can let the EEOC do all the work for
them.
Howard Gardner
54 Id. at 459.
55 Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 812.
56 See id.
57 Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 460.
58 Id. at 461.
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